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1 
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND COLORADO’S 
COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE 
LAMAR F. JOST & MARISSA S. RONK† 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA or Act)1 
mandates near-universal healthcare coverage for Americans. Tax-paying 
individuals and entities largely fund the statutory system that permits 
near-universal healthcare coverage. Taxpayers, therefore, are not collat-
eral to any insurance policy purchased on a federally mandated health 
exchange. As a result, an unresolved issue in Colorado (and around the 
country) is whether the ACA disaffirms the collateral source rule. This 
article examines that issue under Colorado law. 
I. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
In 2010, President Obama signed the ACA into law.2 Most of the 
key features of the ACA became effective on January 1, 2014.3 The 
Act’s purpose was to provide near-universal health coverage to Ameri-
cans.4 Since January 1, 2014, an estimated 16.9 million Americans pur-
chased insurance on ACA-mandated health insurance exchanges.5 
The ACA thus effectuated a “sea change” in American society.6 
That change did not come without challenges from various states, inter-
est groups, and individuals.7 The ACA, however, has withstood every 
major constitutional and statutory challenge. It is the law of the land, 
requiring legislators, judges, and lawyers to evaluate the effects of the 
  
 † LaMar F. Jost is a partner at Wheeler Trigg O’Donnell LLP. Mr. Jost focuses on medical 
malpractice, product liability, mass torts, and complex commercial matters. Marissa S. Ronk is an 
associate at Wheeler Trigg O’Donnell LLP. Ms. Ronk’s legal practice focuses on complex commer-
cial litigation at both the trial and appellate levels, and she has prior experience handling product 
liability and consumer class action matters. The authors thank Marta Strzeszewski, paralegal at 
WilmerHale’s Denver office, for her invaluable editorial assistance with this article. 
 1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended at scattered sections 
of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 2. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, With a 
Flourish, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/policy/24health.html. 
 3. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Key Features of the ACA by Year, 
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts-and-features/key-features-of-aca-by-year/index.html. 
 4. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS Strategic Plan, Strategic Goal 1: Strengthen 
Healthcare, http://www.hhs.gov/about/strategic-plan/strategic-goal-1/index.html. 
 5. Press Release, Rand Corporation, Health Coverage Grows Under Affordable Care Act 
(May 6, 2015), http://www.rand.org/news/press/2015/05/06.html. 
 6. See generally Ann S. Levin, The Fate of the Collateral Source Rule After Healthcare 
Reform, 60 UCLA L. REV. 736 (2013); Benjamin A. Geslison & Kevin T. Jacobs, The Collateral 
Source Rule and Medical Expenses: Anticipated Effects of The Affordable Care Act and Recent State 
Case Law on Damages in Personal Injury Lawsuits, 80 DEF. COUNS. J. 239, 239 (2013). 
 7. See, e.g., Geslison & Jacobs, supra, note 6, at 240 (discussing challenges to the ACA and 
concluding its “future . . . now appears secure”). 
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ACA upon state law.8 At least three major changes to state law have po-
tentially arisen following the implementation of the ACA. 
First, the ACA’s individual mandate requires all individuals to pur-
chase and provide proof of insurance.9 The individual mandate requires 
that United States citizens and permanent legal residents maintain health 
insurance coverage through an employer, public health insurance, or an 
individual policy.10 Individuals who fail to procure or maintain such in-
surance are subject to a penalty that the Internal Revenue Service impos-
es as a tax.11 The United States Supreme Court upheld the ACA’s indi-
vidual mandate as a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing powers.12 
Second, to ensure universal healthcare is achieved, the ACA prohib-
its insurance companies from denying individuals health insurance based 
on preexisting conditions.13 The ACA expressly addresses “essential 
health benefits” that must be covered for individuals who maintain insur-
ance.14 Essential health benefits include ambulatory patient services, 
emergency services, hospitalizations, maternity and newborn care, men-
tal and behavioral health, substance abuse disorder services, prescription 
drugs, rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices, laboratory 
services, preventative and wellness services, chronic disease manage-
ment, and pediatric services, including oral and vision care.15 
The ACA limits the annual amounts of out-of-pocket medical ex-
penses that can be incurred, excluding premiums.16 As of 2015, the ACA 
limits the annual amounts of out-of-pocket medical expenses to $6,600 
per individual and $13,200 per family.17 Health insurers may not estab-
lish an annual or lifetime limit on the value of benefits they pay for any 
participant.18 
Third, the ACA ensures participation in the insurance markets 
through a complex subsidy program for low-income individuals and for 
those who do not receive health insurance through the government or a 
family member’s employer.19 The Congressional Budget Office esti-
  
 8. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); King v. Burwell, 
135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015); Erin Christen Miller & Ryan J. Sullivan, Looking Toward the Future, Beg-
ging for the Past: The ACA and Market-Rate Predictability for Future Damages, 57 No. 4 DRI FOR 
DEF. 18 (2015) (“Despite more than 40 congressional attempts to undermine or repeal the bill, the 
ACA remains intact.”). 
 9. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012). 
 10. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a).  
 11. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1). 
 12. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 13. See 45 C.F.R. pts. 144, 146, 147 (2013). 
 14. 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2012). 
 15. Id. 
 16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 18022(c)(1), 18071. 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c)(1); 26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(2)(A)(ii) (2012). 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-14 (2012). 
 19. See Joshua Congdon-Hohman & Victor Matheson, Potential Effects of the Affordable 
Care Act on the Award of Life Care Expenses, 24 J. FORENSIC ECON. 153 (2013). 
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mates that by 2021, 95% of nonelderly, legal residents will be insured 
under the ACA.20 
II. COLORADO TORT DAMAGES LAW 
Plaintiffs have a legal obligation in civil cases to mitigate damag-
es.21 If a plaintiff does so, he or she can generally recover three types of 
damages: (1) economic damages, (2) noneconomic damages, and (3) 
punitive damages under limited circumstances.22 Economic damages are 
awarded for past or future pecuniary losses the plaintiff suffered as a 
result of his or her injury, including reasonable and necessary medical 
expenses.23 Noneconomic damages are awarded for non-pecuniary losses 
the plaintiff suffered as a result of the injury, such as pain and suffer-
ing.24 Punitive damages are awarded to punish a tortfeasor who fraudu-
lently, maliciously, or willfully and wantonly caused injury.25 
In Colorado medical malpractice actions, the Healthcare Availabil-
ity Act limits all damages recoverable against healthcare professionals 
and institutions to $1,000,000.26 Not more than $300,000 of that award 
can represent non-economic damages.27 A Colorado district (trial) court, 
however, can allow a jury to exceed the $1,000,000 statutory cap if it 
determines that (1) economic damages would exceed the statutory cap 
and (2) application of the statutory cap would be unfair.28 
III. THE COLORADO COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE 
“A collateral source is a person or company, wholly independent of 
an alleged tortfeasor, that compensates an injured party for that person’s 
injury.”29 Colorado’s collateral source rule consists of two components: 
(1) a pre-verdict evidentiary component and (2) a post-verdict setoff 
rule.30  
  
 20. CBO's Analysis of the Major Health Care Legislation Enacted in March 2010: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Health, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong. 8 (2011) (statement 
of Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Congressional Budget Office), available at http:// 
www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/121xx/doc12119/03-30-healthcarelegislation.pdf.; see also Jeanne Sahadi, 
Health reform’s cost under scrutiny, CNN MONEY, Mar. 13. 2012, 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/12/news/economy/health-reform-costs. 
 21. COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(c).  
 22. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Crossgrove, 276 P.3d 562, 566 (Colo. 2012); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 13-21-102; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5. 
 23. CJI-Civ. 6:1. 
 24. Id.; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5(2)(b). 
 25. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(a). 
 26. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302(1)(b). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Smith v. Jeppesen, 277 P.3d 224, 228 (Colo. 2012). 
 30. Sunahara v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 280 P.3d 649, 654 (Colo. 2012). 
4 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
Under the pre-verdict evidentiary rule, all evidence of benefits from 
a collateral source is inadmissible at trial.31 The post-verdict setoff rule 
requires the trial court to reduce a successful plaintiff’s verdict as a mat-
ter of law by the amount the plaintiff has been or will be wholly or par-
tially indemnified or compensated by another person, corporation, insur-
ance company, or fund in relation to the injury sustained.32  
The statutory collateral source rule, however, contains a “contract” 
exception.33 The contract exception provides that benefits paid to a plain-
tiff as a result of a contract—such as a contract of insurance—will not 
reduce the verdict.34 The contract exception thus swallows the post-
verdict setoff rule, essentially restoring the common-law collateral source 
rule in Colorado.  
Colorado courts developed the common-law collateral source rule 
in order to ensure that a tortfeasor could not be relieved of the conse-
quences of its wrong through a plaintiff’s prudence and foresight in ob-
taining insurance.35 The same rationale is used to justify the contract 
exception to the statutory collateral source rule.36 Even though the rule 
may result in a plaintiff recovering for the same injury twice, the rule 
was justified on the ground that the windfall should inure to the benefit 
of the plaintiff, who had the foresight to purchase insurance, thereby 
generally encouraging the public to purchase insurance.37  
IV. THE ACA’S EFFECT ON TORT DAMAGES 
The ACA changes the legal landscape for litigating damages be-
cause it undermines the purpose of the collateral source rule.38 Litigants 
have advanced three arguments in favor of the admission of benefits pro-
vided pursuant to an ACA insurance policy. 
A. Purchase and Maintenance of Insurance.  
A primary policy justification for the collateral source rule (and 
“contract exception” in Colorado) is that the collateral source rule en-
  
 31. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Cosgrove, 276 P.3d 562, 564 & n.3; see also COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 10-1-135(10)(a). 
 32. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.6. 
 33. See Volunteers of Am. Colo. Branch v. Gardenswartz, 242 P.3d 1080, 1084 (Colo. 2010). 
 34. COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-21-111.6. 
 35. Riss & Co. v. Anderson, 114 P.2d 278, 281 (Colo. 1941). 
 36. Colo. Permanente, P.C. v. Evans, 926 P.2d 1218, 1233 (Colo. 1996) (en banc) (explaining 
the purpose of the contract exception is to “ensure that a defendant does not receive a windfall by 
avoiding payment of damages because the plaintiff had the foresight to purchase insurance, or enter 
into a contract that compensates the plaintiff for injury caused by the defendant”). 
 37. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070, 1074–75 (Colo. 1992). 
 38. See generally Miller & Sullivan, supra, note 8; Levin, supra, note 6; Geslison & Jacobs, 
supra, note 6; Congon-Hohman & Matheson, supra, note 19, at 153; Rebecca Levenson, Allocating 
the Costs of Harm to Whom They Are Due: Modifying the Collateral Source Rule after Health Care 
Reform, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 921 (2012). 
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courages the purchase and maintenance of insurance.39 The ACA, how-
ever, eliminates this rationale in support of the collateral source rule.40 
The purchase of insurance is no longer left to individual judgment.41 Ra-
ther, the federal government made a decision for all U.S. citizens and 
legal permanent residents (with limited exceptions): individuals must 
maintain or purchase insurance.42 
B. Windfall of Benefits 
  Second, courts have recognized that the collateral source rule per-
mits a “double recovery”—insurance benefits plus a monetary tort award 
for the same injury.43 Although double recovery of the same injury is 
generally not permissible,44 courts have traditionally permitted double 
recovery in the collateral source context because “if the plaintiff was 
himself responsible for the benefit, as by maintaining his own insurance . 
. . the law allows him to keep it for himself.”45 The fact that nearly every 
individual is now required to purchase or maintain insurance stands in 
contrast to this line of reasoning;46 no longer is the benefit a matter of an 
individual’s “prudence and foresight,”47 but rather it is a matter of gov-
ernment mandate.  
C. Right of Subrogation  
  Third, and finally, a classically given justification for the collateral 
source rule was that the right of subrogation prevented a plaintiff from 
receiving double recovery. The ACA, however, does not provide insurers 
with a right of subrogation (unlike Medicare and Medicaid and under 
ERISA). Because there is no similar provision in the ACA, it “does not 
  
 39. See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 611 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Wis. 2000) (holding “[t]he 
tortfeasor who is responsible for causing injury is not relieved of his or her obligation to the victim 
simply because the victim had the foresight to arrange, or good fortune to receive, benefits from a 
collateral source for injuries and expenses”). 
 40. See Levin, supra, note 6, at 768 (finding that “[t]he individual mandate eliminates the 
need for the collateral source rule to incentivize the purchase of insurance”).  
 41. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012) (“An applicable individual shall for each month beginning 
after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an applicable 
individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such month.”). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Cosgrove, 276 P.3d 562, 565 (Colo. 2012). 
 44. See, e.g., Levy v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 293 P.3d 40, 45 (Colo. App. 2011) (noting 
that no public policy is served by allowing double recovery). 
 45. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A, cmt. b (1979).  
 46. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012) (“An applicable individual shall for each month beginning 
after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an applicable 
individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such month.”). 
 47. See Riss & Co. v. Anderson, 108 Colo. 78, 84 (1941) (holding “a tortfeasor may not plead 
his victim’s prudence and foresight [in purchasing insurance] to relieve him from the consequences 
of his own wrong”). 
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appear that private, non-employer-based insurers on the exchanges are 
entitled to the same reimbursement.”48 
V. ADMISSIBILITY OF COLLATERAL SOURCE EVIDENCE POST-ACA 
No published case law exists in Colorado on the admissibility of 
collateral source evidence after the ACA’s effective date. To date, it ap-
pears that at least five states have addressed the intersection of the ACA 
and the collateral source rule.49 The results are mixed, and depend on the 
particular state’s formulation of the collateral source rule.50 Colorado 
courts and legislators, therefore, can write on a clean slate when address-
ing the intersection of the ACA and collateral source rule. 
To begin, insurance maintained under the ACA is not wholly inde-
pendent of a tortfeasor if the tortfeasor is a taxpayer. Unlike private in-
surance schemes, insurance policies purchased or maintained post-ACA 
are inexorably linked to the tax code.51 The individual mandate is only 
constitutional because it operates as a tax.52 The ACA is funded by tax-
payers, including civil defendants, through a universal cost-sharing pool 
operated by the federal government to provide health insurance while 
lowering health insurance premiums.53 Because insurance is now univer-
  
 48. Victor A. Matheson, Jon Karraker, & Joshua Congdon-Hohman, Medical Damages: 
Settlements and Awards Under the Affordable Care Act, 57 No. 8 DRI FOR DEF. 38 (2015) (“[T]he 
right of subrogation is not granted to insurers under the ACA.”). 
 49. See generally Deeds v. Univ. of Penn. Med. Ctr., 110 A.3d 1009 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) 
(defendant’s comments suggesting coverage were in “patent violation of the collateral source rule” 
despite the ACA); Donaldson v. Advantage Health Physicians, PC, No. 11-091810-NH (Kent Cnty. 
Cir. Ct. Mich. 2015) (Buth, J.) (denying the defendants’ motion in limine, concluding the “medical 
care and therapies [that] would be provided by insurance through the ACA can be discussed/argued 
at trial”); First Bankers Trust Co. v. Memorial Med. Ctr., No. 11L184 (Ill. 7th Cir., Sangamon Cnty. 
2015) (Kelley, J.) (granting in part the plaintiff’s motion in limine, concluding the defendants could 
produce evidence of the ACA only as to its effect on actual reasonable costs of medical services, but 
could not refer to the ACA’s effect on out-of-pocket costs payable by the plaintiff or available insur-
ance coverage); Jones v. Metrohealth Med. Ctr., No. CV11757131 (Ct. of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga 
Cnty., Ohio) (Suster, J.) (using the plaintiff’s premium under the ACA in calculating future econom-
ic damages); Christy v. Humility of Mary Health Partners, No. 2013CV01598 (Ct. of Common 
Pleas, Trumbull Cnty., Ohio) (Logan, J.) (concluding any reference to a collateral source would be 
improper but also noting it could not “restrict reference to the Affordable Care Act as it is the law of 
the land” and noting it could not prohibit the defendants from “presenting their own damage assess-
ments for future care”); Halsne v. Avera Health, No. 12-cv-2409 (SRN/JJG), 2014 WL 1153504 (D. 
Minn. Mar. 21, 2014) (denying the defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment to limit the 
plaintiff’s future medical expenses damages to the projected payments of premiums and deductibles 
under the ACA); Vasquez-Sierra v. Hennepin Faculty Assocs., No. 27-cv-12-1611, 2012 WL 
7150829 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 2012) (observing that “[u]ntil the Minnesota legislature passes 
new legislation regarding collateral sources in light of the Affordable Care Act, this court will not re-
write long-standing law regarding collateral sources”). 
 50. See cases cited supra note 49. 
 51. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 4375–77. 
 52. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012). 
 53. See id. at 2585 (finding that “[b]y requiring that individuals purchase health insurance, the 
mandate prevents cost-shifting by those who would otherwise go without it. In addition, the mandate 
forces into the insurance risk pool more healthy individuals whose premiums on average will be 
higher than their health care expenses. This allows insurers to subsidize the costs of covering the 
unhealthy individuals the reforms require them to accept. The Government claims that Congress has 
power under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses to enact this solution.”). 
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sally available and no longer wholly independent of any taxpaying de-
fendant, the collateral source rule would seemingly no longer apply. 
Even assuming the ACA evidence is wholly independent of civil 
defendants, ACA evidence is nevertheless relevant to essential elements 
of plaintiffs’ prima facie obligations, witness credibility, and defendants’ 
affirmative mitigation defenses. 
A. Plaintiffs’ Damages Claims  
  The ACA permits the trier of fact to determine the actual out-of-
pocket expenses for a plaintiff’s alleged future medical expenses. In Col-
orado, “[a] jury’s discretion in awarding damages is limited by the pa-
rameters of what the law will allow.”54 Relevant evidence is, of course, 
evidence that has a tendency to prove or disprove a fact of consequence 
to a pending action.55 The ACA’s individual mandate, requiring the pur-
chase of insurance for “essential health benefits,” with a limit on out-of-
pocket expenses has the tendency to prove or disprove the amount of 
future damages—a fact of consequence to the action, as it can affect the 
verdict potential by millions of dollars.56 
B. Credibility of Damages Experts  
  ACA limits on out-of-pocket expenses are also relevant to the cred-
ibility of expert witnesses. The credibility of a witness is always a fact of 
consequence to the action.57 Moreover, “[a]n award of future medical 
expenses must be based upon substantial evidence that establishes the 
reasonable probability that such expenses will necessarily be incurred.”58 
The ACA limits out-of-pocket expenses for future medical expenses 
without regard to preexisting conditions.59 A physiatrist, life care plan-
ner, or economist who does not take these federally mandated limitations 
into consideration in formulating a life care plan or calculating the cost 
  
 54. Huffman v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 205 P.3d 501, 510 (Colo. App. 2009).  
 55. COLO. R. EVID. 401. 
 56. For example, in the course of personal injury litigation, a plaintiff produces a life care 
plan outlining the medical care, equipment, and medication the plaintiff will need for the duration of 
his or her life expectancy. The plaintiff’s economist calculates the present value of all future care 
needs, totaling a minimum of $13,000,000. However, the defendant’s economist finds that nearly all 
of the alleged future medical costs are defined as “essential health benefits” under the ACA, and 
calculates the present value of all future care needs by adding the maximum cost of out-of-pocket 
expenses plus premiums under the ACA. The defendant’s economist therefore calculates that the 
cost for all the plaintiff’s requested future medical care is $402,000. Thus, the difference in the 
amount of tort calculations when taking the ACA into account in such a case would be $12,598,000. 
 57. See COLO. R. EVID. 611 (credibility of the witness is always relevant on cross-
examination). 
 58. Wallbank v. Rothenberg, 74 P.3d 413, 419 (Colo. App. 2003) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
 59. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) (“This requirement is essential to creating effective health 
insurance markets in which improved health insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do not 
exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold.”). 
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of a plan will likely be unable to establish that such costs will be neces-
sarily incurred.60 
C. Defendants’ Mitigation Defenses  
Finally, ACA evidence should be admissible for the purpose of 
proving that a plaintiff failed to mitigate damages. A plaintiff in a tort 
action has a duty to take such steps as are reasonable under the circum-
stances to mitigate damages sustained.61 The Restatement provides that 
one injured by the tort of another “is not entitled to recover damages for 
any harm that he could have avoided by the use of reasonable effort or 
expenditure after the commission of a tort.”62 The purchase of insurance 
to cover essential health benefits (even after the injury), as federal law 
requires, is a reasonable expenditure to avoid incurring future medical 
expenses.63  
In sum, the policy justifications that previously permitted a plain-
tiff’s double recovery in the context of the collateral source rule do not 
exist in the post-ACA era. Courts and legislators must squarely address 
the societal and legal changes that exist in America’s universal health 
system. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The ACA has injected a host of arguments, strategy, time, and ex-
pense into litigating future tort damage awards. Vigorous argument will 
continue from both plaintiff and defense lawyers because, in each case, 
millions of dollars may be at issue. As seen in the few states that have 
tried to address the collateral source rule in the post-ACA world, the 
legal landscape surrounding the law and health insurance is far from 
clear. What is clear, however, is that the policy justifications underlying 
the collateral source rule no longer exist. 
 
  
 60. See Smith v. Jeppesen, 277 P.3d 224, 226 (Colo. 2012) (proper medical expenses damages 
should be the necessary and reasonable value of the medical services rendered).  
 61. Banning v. Prester, 317 P.3d 1284, 1287–88 (Colo. App. 2012). 
 62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918. 
 63. See, e.g., Parking Mgmt. Inc. v. Jacobsen, 257 A.2d 479, 481 (D.C. 1969). 
